A damning second inquiry has criticised the emergency response to the 2017 Manchester Arena terror attack, revealing that victims were left “waiting in vain” and “desperate for rescue” that never came. The report highlights serious failures in coordination and communication between emergency services, which meant at least one of the 22 victims’ deaths could have been avoided.
The suicide bomber Salman Abedi detonated his device at the end of an Ariana Grande concert, killing 22 people including eight-year-old Saffie-Rose Roussos and 28-year-old John Atkinson. The inquiry found that paramedics and fire crews were delayed and not deployed properly due to a “loss of communication” between emergency services. Those trapped inside the City Room heard “ambulance sirens outside” while help failed to reach them in time.
The report concluded that Saffie-Rose might have survived with a different rescue approach. John Atkinson “would have probably lived” if he had been hospitalised sooner and if the emergency response had been better coordinated.
“A great lot went wrong,” said Sir John Saunders, chairman of the inquiry. “The emergency services’ performance was far below the standard that it should have been. Their best was not good enough in some situations.” He also praised the “heroic gestures” of bystanders who risked their own lives to aid victims. Describing the City Room scene as a “war zone,” Sir John said helping the injured “took considerable fortitude.”
The inquiry identified failings by Greater Manchester Police (GMP), Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS), and North West Ambulance Service (NWAS). GMP failed to lead the response effectively or follow official guidance. GMFRS arrived late, missing the critical moment when help was most needed. NWAS sent too few paramedics into the City Room.
Other issues included poor radio communication, failure to notify services about the initiation of “Operation Plato” (the terror attack response), and delays in bringing stretchers and ambulances. Sir John acknowledged the huge pressure responders were under but emphasised the need to learn from these mistakes to avoid repeats in future crises.
The exhaustive 900-page report, based on 172,000 documents and testimony from 291 witnesses, offers 149 recommendations. These include updating and assessing major incident plans at least every six months, including non-specialists in multi-agency training exercises, implementing high-fidelity training simulating real terror attacks for responders, and encouraging a culture of rapid response over risk aversion unless absolutely necessary.
Sir John stressed the “starkly clear” differences in risk assessments between emergency services that affected how and when they acted. This report delivers a sobering look at failures that cost lives but offers a roadmap to ensure tragedies like the Manchester Arena attack are met with swifter, better-coordinated rescue efforts in the future.
Originally published by UKNIP.
